bterkuileandClaude Sonnet 5
90ab7c74b1
Finishes the two gaps that mattered most for real use: Invoices#create
(POST invoices) + Invoices#quote (POST invoices/{id}/quote, returning
the new Quote model with the actual payable bolt11 — an invoice alone
has nothing payable until quoted) and Webhook.valid_signature?
(HMAC-SHA256 over the raw body via X-Webhook-Signature, per Strike's own
documented reference implementation, timing-safe compare). Also finishes
Invoices#find (was a stub with a leftover binding.pry) and adds
WebhookEvent to parse the {id, eventType, data: {entityId, changes}}
payload shape — deliberately doesn't expose changed values, since
Strike's webhooks never carry them; a real value only ever comes from
re-fetching the resource.
Client gains #post/#patch (only #get existed before), needed for both
of the above.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0199wudpuAtkhouHKSEGxzpa
39 lines
1.4 KiB
Ruby
39 lines
1.4 KiB
Ruby
# frozen_string_literal: true
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require 'openssl'
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require 'active_support/security_utils'
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module StrikeMe
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module API
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# Verifies the X-Webhook-Signature header Strike attaches to every
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# webhook POST — HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body, keyed by the
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# secret set at webhook-subscription creation time. See
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# https://docs.strike.me/webhooks/signature-verification — this
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# mirrors Strike's own documented reference implementation exactly
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# (hex digest, timing-safe compare), just in Ruby.
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#
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# `raw_body` must be the exact bytes Strike sent, before any
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# JSON-parsing round-trip — re-serializing a parsed body can reorder
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# keys or change whitespace and silently break verification.
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module Webhook
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SIGNATURE_HEADER = 'X-Webhook-Signature'
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def self.valid_signature?(raw_body:, signature:, secret:)
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return false if signature.blank? || raw_body.blank?
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expected = OpenSSL::HMAC.hexdigest('SHA256', secret, raw_body)
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secure_compare(expected, signature)
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end
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# ActiveSupport::SecurityUtils.secure_compare raises on a length
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# mismatch rather than returning false — a garbled/truncated header
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# from a malformed request should fail closed, not raise.
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def self.secure_compare(expected, actual)
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return false unless expected.bytesize == actual.bytesize
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ActiveSupport::SecurityUtils.secure_compare(expected, actual)
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end
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end
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end
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end
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